

Hot summer, cold war

#### • Table of contents

01•	Editorial HOT SUMMER, COLD WAR	P3
02•	Focus SUMMER BRIEF: EU PRODUCTIVITY AND US FISCAL PRESSURE	P4
03•	Macroeconomics LOOKS CAN BE DECEIVING	P6
04•	Fixed Income US CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE UNDER THREAT?	P8
05•	Equities A SOLID REBOUND, BUT LATENT RISKS PERSIST	P10
06•	Forex EURO: THE MISSING LINK	P12
07∙	Asset Allocation INVESTMENT SCENARIO AND ALLOCATION CONVICTIONS	P14
08•	Market Monitor OVERVIEW OF SELECTED MARKETS	P16
09•	Glossary	P17
	Disclaimer	P18



## 01 • Editorial HOT SUMMER, COLD WAR



Delphine
DI PIZIO TIGER
Deputy Global Head of
Investment Management

Dear Reader,

As trade tensions reach a boiling point this summer, the news flow remains as heated as ever. Over the past year, the effective rate of tariffs applied by the United States of America (US) has skyrocketed, climbing from 2.5% to around 15%, even before the latest rounds of tariffs take effect this summer. The result? A double burden for American consumers: higher prices on imported goods due to tariffs and, to a lesser extent, the depreciation of the dollar. This pressure has driven inflation to rise, reaching 2.7% in June, with further acceleration expected in the coming months— albeit at a slower pace than originally projected. On the geopolitical front, the US is ramping up its trade offensive in Southeast Asia. Some countries in the region are now facing tariffs as high as 40%, indirectly striking at China's supply chain. The focus? Transshipment—a practice where goods, often manufactured in China, are routed through a third country, such as Vietnam, before being exported to the US. Vietnam's recent trajectory partially illustrates this dynamic. Capitalising on US-China trade tensions, Vietnam has seen its manufacturing output surge by an impressive 70% over the past eight years, with a near-perfect correlation between the country's rising imports from China and its booming exports to the US.

Looking further, President Donald Trump is targeting countries aligned with the "anti-American" policies of the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The threat? Additional tariffs on nations supporting initiatives like BRICS Pay, a blockchain-based international payment system designed to bypass SWIFT and promote local currencies. Donald Trump pointed out, "The reserve currency is so important. You know, if we lost the dollar as the world's reserve currency, it would be like losing a World War." Against this tense geopolitical backdrop, we will be closely monitoring the Federal Reserve's (Fed) upcoming 4th Conference on the International Roles of the US Dollar, set to take place on 25 and 26 September in New York. Among the topics on the agenda is a focus on cross-border payments.

Meanwhile, Trump is also escalating his stance on the conflict in Ukraine. He has threatened to impose "secondary" tariffs of 100% if a ceasefire is not achieved by 2 September. These sanctions, which raise questions about their feasibility, could target the energy sector, including oil, by hitting Russia's key trading partners such as China and India.

In his quest for the Nobel Peace Prize, Donald Trump presents a dual image: positioning himself as a peacemaker seeking to end open conflicts, while simultaneously fuelling a new Cold War with China. His assessment is accurate—the supremacy of the US and the dollar are under threat. However, his response, centred on massive tariffs, could prove counterproductive, hitting Americans' wallets first. The "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" aims to fuel the US economic engine, but the revenues generated by tariffs may fall short of offsetting their impact on public finances.

Nevertheless, the global economy—and the US economy—remains resilient. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), only 5% of countries worldwide are at risk of recession, a historically low level not seen since 2007. Unemployment in OECD countries has also reached a record low of 5%, while corporate profits surged by 7% year-over-year in the first quarter, driving stock markets to new highs in most advanced economies.

In this edition, we invite you to dive deeper into the topic of US fiscal tensions, and we will also focus on Europe, examining both the productivity challenge and the future of the single currency as the Euro Area prepares to welcome its 21st member—Bulgaria.

Enjoy the read!



#### 02 • Focus

## SUMMER BRIEF: EU PRODUCTIVITY AND US FISCAL PRESSURE



The summer months are not particularly well suited for peak efficiency or budget discipline. But they do offer space to take a step back and zoom out. In this short piece, we explore both Europe's productivity challenge and the strained budgetary picture in the United States.



# PRODUCTIVITY since the pandemic: +2% in the Euro Area +10% in the United States


## EU POLICYMAKERS IN SEARCH OF HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

Over the past six months, sentiment towards Europe has undergone a positive transformation. Developments under Donald Trump have spurred Germany to unveil substantial infrastructure investment plans, accompanied by a broader pan-European initiative to boost defence spending. While this long-overdue political momentum is welcome, it does not imply that the structural challenges constraining Europe's economic potential have been resolved. Several member states continue to grapple with precarious fiscal positions. At the same time, European exporters are exposed to the resurgence of protectionist policies in the United States and intensifying competitive pressure from China. That said, the biggest challenge arguably lies in increasing productivity growth.

Since the start of the pandemic labour productivity increased by only 2% in the Euro Area, a stark contrast with the situation in the US (plus 10%). This adds to the two decade-long widening of the productivity gap between both regions (Chart 1).

There's obviously much more to life than productivity. However, against the background of the energy transition, rapidly ageing populations, geopolitical tensions and budgetary constraints, a reacceleration of productivity growth will probably make things easier. Widespread agreement has now emerged, as also underlined in the Letta and Draghi reports (2024), that Europe's slow productivity growth stems from a lack of market depth and scale. Completing the single market will thus be key to achieve Europe's full growth potential (see Forex, page 12). There is significant potential for removing internal barriers to trade.

CHART 1: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (OUTPUT PER HOUR WORKED, REAL INDEX Q1 2000 = 100)



Source: Eurostat, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Indosuez Wealth Management.



The International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis shows that trade costs within Europe are equivalent to a 44% tariff in manufacturing - three times higher than the 15% observed between states in the US - and up to 110% in services. Fragmented goods and services markets hinder broader efficiency gains and business investment. Completing the single market also includes the integration of capital markets and the creation of a European safe asset. Alongside more coordinated public and defence investment, this is no luxury as the US and China are pushing hard on industrial policy and artificial intelligence (AI). In other words, to have a significant impact, the scale will have to be European rather than national. The question remains whether policymakers can rise above national constraints and help people connect with a bigger European story.

### US GOVERNMENT BUDGET AT ODDS WITH STATE OF THE ECONOMY

With democracy under pressure amid deepseated political polarisation, America's safe haven status has come under scrutiny alongside more intense discussion about the state of it's public finances. While fiscal alarmism stemming directly from the implications of the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" seems exaggerated - with additional revenues from tariffs likely largely offsetting the increase in the deficit - the political willingness to address the budget remains totally absent. What's troubling is not just the size of the deficit -over 6% of GDP- but the fact that it's being run while the US economy is operating near full employment. Moreover, at 4.4%, the US 10-year government bond yield sits close to where we can expect nominal GDP growth to land in the coming years. It is not surprising therefore that public finances in the US have become the subject of an increasing body of academic research.

The current primary deficit (around 3% of GDP) in combination with structurally higher interest rates and rising ageing costs points to ever mounting debt levels in the coming decade. Concerns over ballooning treasury issuance have already driven up the term premium component this year. And given its still low level in a historical perspective and the fiscal situation at hand, the risk of further upward pressure cannot be dismissed.

To be clear, a fiscal crisis is not inevitable. A credible fiscal plan would quickly ease investor concerns. Unfortunately, there is no such plan and the current polarised political landscape offers little hope in this respect. Moreover, the question arises as to what extent the "exorbitant privilege" status continues to offer protection in the event of trust in America's domestic and foreign policies being eroded further. Surely, fears that things will spiral out of control must be thoroughly tempered by the fact that the US government issues debt in its own currency. Therefore, it can always find the means to pay back creditors and avoid a selffulfilling liquidity crisis. At the same time, however, this does not shield the economy from potential adverse effects in the future. Central bank intervention to keep interest rates in check may well (if price stability is considered less important) stoke inflation expectations, whereas financial repression risks suppressing private investment and consumption. And while welcome (though not popular), addressing the issue by means of traditional budgetary efforts (cutting expenditure, increasing taxes, or a combination) would still weigh on economic activity. All in all, the current economic and political context suggests that concerns about US public finances are well-founded. An imminent debt crisis looks unlikely, but the theme of US fiscal vulnerability looks set to remain topical in the coming years.



## 03 • Macroeconomics LOOKS CAN BE DECEIVING



While US inflation has been revised downward in the short-term, reflecting recent trends, a temporary reacceleration is still expected in the coming months—albeit to a lesser extent than initially anticipated. This stands in stark contrast to the outlook in Europe and especially China, where inflation dynamics are more subdued.

#### US: INFLATION, WHAT INFLATION?

After a downturn in growth in the first quarter (Q1), US GDP growth in the second quarter (Q2) is to be supported by an upward reversal on net trade; overall, the 2025 GDP growth forecast remains unchanged for the US at 1.7% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026. However, our inflation narrative has shifted. Inflation came in below expectations for four consecutive months and did not surprise in June (at 2.7% in line with expectations). We have revised our annual inflation forecast to 2.9% in 2025 (down from 3.1%) and 2.8% in 2026 (down from 2.9%). Although not a sharp revision, this adjustment acknowledges the reduced pass-through of tariffs to consumer prices, as both New York and Atlanta Fed surveys indicate a 50% pass-through to consumers - the rest being absorbed by company margins and lower import prices (notably in clothing).

Despite this short-term reprieve, we anticipate a temporary inflationary uptick in the latter half of 2025 and the first half of 2026. Business surveys suggest that price pressures could resurface as the labour market tightens and demand stabilises. However, the rebalancing of the labour market — where hiring has been limited and the unemployment rate is expected to approach 4.5% in the coming months — should help anchor inflation expectations and limit second round price effects on wages.

On the policy front, the Fed is set to proceed cautiously, with markets now pricing a more dovish stance. We anticipate two rate cuts to come in 2025, bringing the Federal Funds rate to 4% by year-end, and two additional cuts expected in 2026 to reach 3.5%, with risks tilted more towards cuts. This reflects the central bank's view that this inflationary shock will be temporary and that the economy can withstand a gradual easing of monetary conditions.

Meanwhile, household and corporate balance sheets remain robust, financial conditions supportive, and supply chains resilient to tariff disruptions. US retail sales rebounded in June (+0.6 over the month, versus 0.1% expected), signalling resilient consumers. A slowdown in growth is expected in late 2025 but is not projected to tip the economy into a recession, with growth expected to recover in 2026. However, risks remain, including the potential for further rate cuts if growth falters more than anticipated. Additionally, the recently passed "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" has raised concerns about the US debt trajectory, although it is not expected to provide significant fiscal stimulus, notably in the context of still high uncertainty.

## EURO AREA: GROWTH SURPRISES, BUT CAUTION PREVAILS

Across the Atlantic, the Euro Area has seen an unexpected boost in growth. Our GDP forecast for 2025 has been revised upwards by 10 basis points (bps) to 1.2%, with 2026 growth remaining steady at 1.4%, above consensus expectations. This growth surprise, however, comes with a caveat: much of the strength appears to be driven by US frontloading of European products ahead of anticipated tariffs. As such, the sustainability of this short-term momentum remains uncertain. The potential volatility in Irish GDP growth, in particular, brings downside risks to Euro Area growth in Q2, before the impact of the German fiscal stimulus plan kicks in late 2025. However, Germany, the region's renewed economic powerhouse, stands to benefit from a new tax reform introduced in May and already set to take effect by the end of 2025. Business surveys point to relative resilience in the German economy: the IFO Expectations Index increased to 90.70 points in June 2025 from 89 points in May, and above forecasts of 90.



US:
an estimated
50%
pass through of
tariffs to consumer
prices



Inflation in the Euro Area is expected to remain stable at 2% in both 2025 and 2026, reflecting continued progress in achieving price stability. The European Central Bank (ECB) is projected to cut its policy rate to 1.75% in 2025, with the ongoing threat of tariffs raising the likelihood of an additional 25 bps cut in a challenging global environment. On the disinflation front, several factors — including a strong euro, modest wage growth, still relatively stable oil prices and limited expected EU tariff retaliation — are expected to help contain inflationary pressures.

## CHINA: PRODUCER PRICES CONTINUE TO MODERATE

China's economic trajectory remains steady, with GDP growth forecast at 4.5% for both 2025 and 2026. The government continues to prioritise consumption and technological investment, aiming to reinforce productivity growth and ensure long-term stability.

China's trade surplus surged to 114.77 billion dollars in June 2025, driven by an above consensus 5.8% export rise amid eased tariff pressures ahead of the August US tariff deadline. However, inflation in China has been revised downward significantly. Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth is now expected at just 0.5% in 2025 (down from 1.4%) and 1% in 2026 (down from 1.5%). These adjustments reflect ongoing producer price deflation and weaker-than-expected inflationary pressures. While fiscal stimulus is expected to taper off, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) remains wellpositioned to provide monetary support, with a further 50 bps rate cut anticipated in 2025. China's ability to sustain growth hinges on the government's strategic focus on consumption and innovation, even as it faces external headwinds.

TABLE 1: MACROECONOMIC FORECAST 2024 - 2026, %

Downward forecasts since last month

Upward forecasts since last month

	ОБІ			INI LATION			
	2024	2025	2026	2024	2025	2026	
United States	2.8%	1.7%	1.6%	3.0%	2.9%	2.8%	
Euro Area	0.8%	1.2%	1.4%	2.4%	2.0%	2.0%	
China	5.0%	4.5%	4.5%	0.2%	0.5%	1.0%	
World	3.2%	2.8%	2.9%	-	-	-	

CDD

Source: Indosuez Wealth Management.

INCL ATION



#### 04 • Fixed Income

#### US CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE UNDER THREAT?



The US Treasury market has had plenty to digest over the past few months: tariffs and the debate over their pass-through effect on inflation, the passing of the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (President Trump's signature domestic policy package that locks in high fiscal deficits for as far as the eye can see), and the usual bombardment of monthly economic data releases.



10-YEAR US TREASURY yield steady at 4.2%-4.6% Despite the heavy news flow, the 10-year US Treasury yield — arguably the world's most important interest rate — has remained remarkably stable, anchored within a narrow range of around 4.2% to 4.6% since the end of April.

While we continue to debate internally about what catalyst might drive a sustainable breakout from this range — either below 4.2% or above 4.6% — there is one looming risk that's giving fixed income market participants chills: the prospect of President Trump firing Jerome Powell, the chairman of the Federal Reserve. Such an event would cast serious doubt on the Fed's independence, a cornerstone of US monetary policy for decades. This scenario represents a quintessential "grey swan" risk: improbable but with potentially significant consequences.

Even during his first term as president, it's safe to say that Donald Trump and Jerome Powell never saw eye to eye. However, the attacks on the Fed chair have escalated significantly under Trump 2.0. In 2019, they were limited to relatively harmless jabs, like critiques of Powell's golfing skills. In recent months, however, Trump and his allies have ramped up the pressure for lower interest rates. When those demands fell on deaf ears, they publicly called for Powell's resignation (despite his four-year term ending quite soon in May 2026 anyway). This campaign culminated on 16 July, with a widely shared news story claiming that Donald Trump was actively preparing to fire Jerome Powell.

Even though Donald Trump walked it back an hour later, we saw a glimpse of what the market reaction would be in this scenario: yields at the short end of the US Treasury curve moved lower, reflecting the likelihood that a new chair appointed by Trump would be more inclined to cut interest rates sooner. However, longer-term yields (10 years and beyond) moved higher, resulting in a sharp steepening of the yield curve.

There are several compelling reasons why such a dramatic move would likely backfire:

#### FIERCE LEGAL CHALLENGES

Removing the Fed chair is not a unilateral decision. The President of the United States does not have the authority to dismiss the chair without cause, such as misconduct, malfeasance or dereliction of duty. Perhaps this is why recent critiques of Jerome Powell have included allegations of mismanagement surrounding the Federal Reserve building renovation project.

## THE FED IS NOT A ONE-PERSON OPERATION

The US Federal Funds rate is set by a committee of 12 voting members, not solely by the Chair. According to the most recent Fed minutes, the vast majority of committee members support holding interest rates steady until there is more clarity on the impact of tariffs on inflation. It is difficult to see how a new, more "dovish" Chair could persuade the committee to completely reverse its stance.




#### COUNTERPRODUCTIVE OUTCOMES

While short-term interest rates are heavily influenced by monetary policy, longer-term rates are largely market-driven and can even move in the opposite direction. Market-based measures of long-term inflation expectations have remained well-anchored around 2.5% this year, a key reason why long-term US Treasury yields have traded within such a tight range. If markets were to believe that the Fed is no longer politically independent or serious about targeting inflation, inflation expectations could surge. This, in turn, would push long-term nominal yields higher. Ironically, for an administration aiming to lower long-term borrowing costs, this move could backfire spectacularly.

That said, even with all these reasons why firing Jerome Powell would be a bad idea, can we completely rule it out? Unfortunately, no. Polymarket, the decentralised prediction market platform, currently places the probability of Jerome Powell being fired by the end of 2025 at 19% (Chart 2). This "grey swan" risk is one of the key factors underpinning our cautious outlook on very long-term US Treasuries. A silver lining for global investors is that there are absolutely no concerns about the independence of the ECB. This, alongside relatively more supportive inflation dynamics in the Euro Area, keep us relatively more constructive about the Euro bond market.

Looking ahead, the only certainty is that Trump 2.0 will keep bond market investors on their toes.

CHART 2: JEROME POWEL OUT AS FED CHAIR IN 2025? ESTIMATES, %



Source: Polymarket (data as of 23.07.2025), Indosuez Wealth Management.

#### 05 • Equities

#### A SOLID REBOUND, BUT LATENT RISKS PERSIST





Equity markets continue their upward *momentum*, buoyed by improving economic indicators and a resurgence in investor confidence. Recession risks appear to be receding, and the "Goldilocks" scenario—characterised by steady growth and moderate inflation—is once again being discussed. Expectations for the second–quarter earnings season remain modest, with only 4% earnings growth forecast in the United States, creating potential for positive surprises. However, heightened volatility and less favourable seasonality during the summer months may present selective market opportunities.


#### **EUROPE**

Europe is showcasing its new structural advantages, benefiting from an improving economic environment supported by more accommodative monetary policy (with a European Central Bank) easing expected) and significant fiscal stimulus plans totalling nearly 1 trillion euros over the next decade. Political commitment to economic sovereignty and more favourable financial conditions are set to bolster growth.

European small- and mid-cap companies stand to gain significantly in this pro-growth environment, offering strong potential after years of underperformance. With earnings growth projected at +14.9% by 2026—well above that of large caps—alongside attractive valuations and subdued inflows, these smaller firms present compelling entry points for investors (Chart 3).

Additionally, domestic players, particularly those benefiting from Europe's reindustrialisation efforts (e.g., construction and defence), as well as financial stocks, continue to offer attractive opportunities.

CHART 3: EARNINGS PER SHARE GROWTH, %



Source: DPAM, Bloomberg (data as of 3.07.2025), Indosuez Wealth Management.



#### UNITED STATES

US equity markets have extended their remarkable rebound, reaching fresh all-time highs, with the S&P 500 surpassing the symbolic 6'200-point mark at the close of 3 July. Positive capital flows driven by investor optimism — particularly among retail investors — remain a significant tailwind for US equities.

This renewed confidence has been further supported by the recent approval of the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" by both chambers of Congress. This legislation includes corporate tax cuts and substantial increases in military and infrastructure spending, which are expected to benefit industrial sectors and domestic companies.

The "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" also serves as a major catalyst for US small- and mid-cap stocks. Provisions expanding interest deductibility could boost earnings by +12%, according to some analysts, given the capital-intensive nature of these companies and their sensitivity to financing costs. Less exposed to trade tensions than large-cap exporters, these companies are also set to benefit from a weaker dollar and a favourable domestic and political environment. While short-term financing costs remain a constraint, anticipated earnings improvements in the second half of 2025, combined with fiscal support, enhance their attractiveness.



+22.6%
earnings growth
forecast for US small
caps in 2026

#### ASIA

Asian equity markets saw a significant recovery in June, as global trade tensions eased following a temporary truce in the US-China trade war. This agreement has, for now, stabilised relations between the two superpowers and improved global investor sentiment.

In South Korea, the election of President Lee Jae-Myung has reignited major corporate governance reforms aimed at reducing the valuation discount in the Korean market. Proposed tax reforms also aim to encourage higher dividend payout ratios through preferential tax treatment. Over time, these developments could support the equity market and attract more foreign investors.

#### INVESTMENT STYLES

In the US, the market rebound has been more concentrated around growth-oriented themes, which continue to show more resilient earnings revisions. A standout example is Nvidia, which recently achieved a record-breaking market capitalisation of 4 trillion dollars—the first company in history to do so—bringing it close to the combined market cap of all companies in the EURO STOXX 501.

This milestone underscores the growing investor focus on artificial intelligence (AI)-related themes. Notably, the technology and communication services sectors in the US continue to exhibit superior earnings growth compared to other sectors. Moreover, corporate investment intentions in these areas have been revised upward for 2025. This trend is complemented by rising investment in utilities, particularly in energy production and distribution, driven by increasing electricity demand.



#### EURO: THE MISSING LINK



Despite the pullback in July, the euro currency index remains up nearly 16% year-to-date. The rise, however, conceals a deeper issue: the euro still lacks the fiscal and financial backbone—a true capital markets union—that would make it a global reference currency. Progress is underway, but this "missing link" keeps the euro strong, though not yet supreme.



EURO
hits
1.17
against the dollar
mid-2025

Since the start of 2025, the euro has strengthened significantly against the dollar (+13% mid-July). While impressive, this appreciation is not historically high — the euro traded above 1.20 and even near 1.40 during previous cycles. The recent driver behind the latest move is largely dollar weakness, more than euro resurgence. Amid concerns over dollar weaponisation, slowing US growth, Fed rate cut expectations and fiscal uncertainty, investors are diversifying away from the dollar and giving the euro more credit, thanks to the Euro Area's policy stability and improved growth prospects.

Yet, for all its recent strength, the euro remains structurally incomplete as a true global reserve currency. If we take into account the assessment of the Atlantic Council (Chart 4), the Euro Area outshines the US on share of global trade (13% versus 11%) and now presents more stable domestic macroeconomic policy, but it lags behind the US, the United Kingdom and Japan on the size and depth of its financial market.

#### MOMENTUM IS BUILDING

This is the reason why the new Savings and Investment Union (SIU) launched in March 2025 matters. The SIU aims to channel Europe's vast private savings into productive cross-border investments, reduce reliance on foreign financing, and deepen equity and debt markets. It capitalises on the unfinished banking and capital union proposals launched after the global financial crisis.

Europe has ample savings but not enough investment, with the private sector's contribution more pertinent than ever given the significant investment needs and fiscal constraints (outside of Germany). In Europe, savings are mostly kept in domestic economies, with 80% held in bank deposits that banks are less likely to lend across borders due to a strong "home bias", according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This bias is explained by regulatory barriers that limit cross-border financial activity and hinder the development of unified capital markets.

CHART 4: WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO BE A RESERVE CURRENCY?

USD	EUR	GBP	JPY	RMB	INR	RUB	
							A sizeable domestic economy
							Importance of the economy in international trade
							Size, depth, openness of the financial markets
							Convertibility of the currency
							Use of the currency as a currency peg or anchor
							Stable domestic macroeconomy conditions and policies

Source: Atlantic Council, Indosuez Wealth Management.





For instance, Europe's low issuance of securitised assets stems from non-uniform regulations and high capital charges, which make it challenging to package mortgages from multiple EU countries into a single security — a comprehensive reform package on this area was proposed by the European Commission in June 2025, continued steps in the right direction.

All in all, the SIU drives growth, enhances strategic autonomy by reducing reliance on external funding, and strengthens the euro's global role through deeper, more liquid Euro Area capital markets.

The planned issuance of bonds at the EU level — as Europe takes charge of its own defence — could also make an important contribution to achieving these objectives. The EU's joint financing strategy initially gained traction through initiatives like NextGenerationEU. These supranational Eurobonds, backed by the EU budget, represent an embryonic form of common debt. While still limited in scale, they lay the groundwork for a pan-European safe asset — a prerequisite for reserve currency status.

The SAFE (Security Action For Europe) proposed alongside the ReArm Europe plan in January 2025, will provide 150 billion euros in long-term, low-cost loans to member states for their national defence procurement plans, funded by EU borrowing. This slow but meaningful integration is seen as structurally "euro-positive" in the long run.

Finally, Germany's fiscal splurge is likewise seen as supportive for the euro as it also deepens the euro safe asset pool, providing more liquidity and a boost to euro growth. The ECB's introduction of the digital euro is however more of a wild card signalling modernisation but only impactful if widely adopted.

## WHAT TO EXPECT GOING AHEAD IN THE SHORT-TERM

The dollar depreciation may take a breather in the coming weeks as a lot of negative news is already factored in. Furthermore, despite rate cuts ahead, the interest rate differential with the euro remains in favour of the dollar. This would not necessarily be bad news for Europe and the rest of the world at a time when tariffs are coming back on the table; the decline in the dollar was acting as an additional "tariff" on global exporters. Nevertheless, the euro's medium-term trajectory remains positive and will increasingly depend on progress on institutional reform and capital market integration.

Elsewhere, the Swiss franc also remains a solid funding currency, as deflationary fears recede. The yen is stuck between a rock and a hard place, as general elections came at a time of heightened uncertainty on US tariffs, with the US-Japan interest rate spread sill driving the USD/JPY rate.

The strongest alternative to the dollar remains gold, now functioning as the second *de facto* reserve currency (surpassing the euro), especially in emerging markets.



## 07 • Asset Allocation INVESTMENT SCENARIO AND ALLOCATION CONVICTIONS



Grégory STEINER Global Head of Multi Asset



Adrien ROURE Portfolio Manager



Return to
NEUTRAL
on
EQUITIES

#### INVESTMENT SCENARIO

- Growth: In the US, our growth forecasts remain unchanged at 1.7% for 2025 and 1.6% for 2026. Risks to growth appear broadly balanced, with the labour market showing signs of moderation yet remaining resilient. Improving financial conditions and the recently approved fiscal stimulus package are expected to support economic activity. However, the medium-term impact of tariffs on the US economy remains uncertain. In the Euro Area, we forecast growth of 1.2% in 2025 and 1.4% in 2026, driven by the gradual implementation of Germany's fiscal stimulus plan. Meanwhile, emerging markets continue to act as the engine of global growth.
- Inflation: Recent favourable trends in US inflation, combined with a lower-than-expected impact of tariffs on prices, lead us to revise our 2025 inflation forecast to 2.9%. However, business surveys suggest a temporary rise in prices over the coming months. In the Euro Area, inflation is expected to stabilise around 2%, supported by the appreciation of the euro, a slowdown in wage growth, and an influx of low-cost goods from China.
- Central Banks: We maintain our forecast for two Fed rate cuts in 2025, with a terminal rate of 3.5% by the end of 2026. This reflects the transitory nature of the inflationary shock caused by tariffs and the gradual cooling of the labour market. In the Euro Area, the ECB benefits from greater flexibility and has already implemented several rate cuts. We anticipate one further reduction, with risks skewed to the downside, particularly if the euro strengthens further or if the Fed accelerates its monetary easing.
- Corporate Earnings: Downward revisions to earnings expectations appear to have stabilised. The second-quarter earnings season begins against a backdrop of relatively modest expectations, limiting the risk of significant negative surprises. The impact of tariffs on profit margins, as well as the effect of euro appreciation on European corporate earnings, will be closely monitored.

• Risk environment: With US equity valuations remaining elevated and significant political and economic milestones on the horizon this summer, volatility could resurface, exacerbated by the low liquidity typically seen during this period. Given the current low levels of realised volatility, and as part of a prudent risk management approach, we continue to favour incorporating low-cost optional hedging strategies.

#### ASSET ALLOCATION CONVICTIONS

#### **Equities**

- Following a period of tactical caution on equity markets driven by numerous uncertainties, we have decided to return to a neutral position relative to our benchmarks. This decision reflects a significant improvement in the macroeconomic environment, supported by fiscal stimulus measures, easing geopolitical tensions, and a Fed that, while remaining cautious, retains the flexibility to intervene should the labour market experience a significant downturn.
- On a microeconomic level, stabilising earnings forecasts, combined with the structurally positive impact of share buyback programmes, provide additional support for equity markets. However, given elevated valuations and key upcoming events this summer, we cannot rule out a resurgence of volatility, which could create attractive entry points for considering an overweight position in equities.
- From a geographic perspective, we maintain our preference for European equities. Investment flows remain favourable, with investors seeking to diversify their portfolios away from US assets. Within the region, we remain positive on undervalued stocks and small-cap companies, which should benefit from ECB rate cuts and are less vulnerable to euro appreciation. We also maintain a constructive outlook on emerging market equities, particularly in Asia. These markets benefit from a favourable growth differential compared to developed economies, a marked depreciation of the dollar and accommodative monetary policies from local central banks.



#### Fixed Income

- We maintain an underweight duration stance relative to our benchmarks. In the US, fiscal uncertainties, exacerbated by the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" stimulus package and the refinancing of a significant portion of debt, are expected to continue putting pressure on the term premium and long maturities. We therefore favour Euro Area government bonds, particularly shorter maturities (up to five years), which are less exposed to fiscal risks and supported by the ECB's expected rate cuts.
- In credit markets, we remain cautious on US credit assets. Elevated valuations and the limited compression of spreads no longer adequately compensate investors for the risks involved. Conversely, we maintain our conviction on European credit, which is underpinned by strong fundamentals and dynamic primary activity, reflecting growing investor interest in yield-generating assets. This asset class is likely to continue attracting significant inflows, supported by an increasingly favourable yield differential relative to money market funds.

#### Forex market

- Following a sharp depreciation of the dollar, particularly against the euro, this trend may lose momentum in the short-term. Markets are reassessing the Fed's rate cut trajectory, while the ECB has signalled discomfort with a euro approaching 1.20. Furthermore, net positioning on the dollar remains vulnerable to a reversal of short positions.
- Over the medium-term, our outlook for the dollar remains negative, with institutional hedging flows likely to cap any significant rebound. In this context, we continue to favour gold as the ultimate safe-haven asset. It offers optimal diversification and benefits from structurally strong demand from central banks.

#### KEY CONVICTIONS - TACTICAL VIEW

O June 2025 July 2025 **EQUITIES** Europe USA  $\bigcirc$ Japan **Emerging Markets** Small Caps Europe Small Caps US Value Europe Value US Growth Europe Growth US BONDS Government bonds (EUR) Corporate IG bonds (EUR) High Yield (EUR) Government bonds (USD) Corporate IG bonds (USD) High Yield (USD) Emerging Market bonds (Local Currency)\* USD VS. EUR GOLD

Source: Indosuez Wealth Management.

<sup>\*</sup> Overweight only in the USD grid.



## 08 • Market Monitor (local currencies) OVERVIEW OF SELECTED MARKETS

DATA AS OF 25.07.2025



GOVERNMENT BONDS	YIELD	4 WEEKS CHANGE (BPS)	YTD CHANGE (BPS)
US Treasury 10-year	4.39%	11.09	-18.12
France 10-year	3.39%	12.10	19.10
Germany 10-year	2.72%	12.60	35.20
Spain 10-year	3.31%	8.90	25.60
Switzerland 10-year	0.44%	-2.50	11.50
Japan 10-year	1.60%	16.80	51.60
BONDS	LAST	4 WEEKS CHANGE	YTD CHANGE
Government Bonds Emerging Markets	40.44	0.70%	12.06%
Euro Government Bonds	212.13	-0.16%	1.40%
Corporate EUR high yield	238.50	0.75%	3.15%
Corporate USD high yield	380.94	0.68%	5.36%
US Government Bonds	327.04	-0.12%	3.66%
Corporate Emerging Markets	45.47	0.33%	2.46%
CURRENCIES	LAST SPOT	4 WEEKS CHANGE	YTD CHANGE
EUR/CHF	0.9336	-0.25%	-0.69%
GBP/USD	1.3438	-2.03%	7.37%
USD/CHF	0.7954	-0.45%	-12.34%
EUR/USD	1.1742	0.20%	13.41%
USD/JPY	147.69	2.10%	-6.05%
VOLATILITY INDEX	LAST	4 WEEKS CHANGE (POINTS)	YTD CHANGE (POINTS)
VIX	14.93	-1.39	-2.42


EQUITY INDICES	LAST PRICE	4 WEEKS CHANGE	YTD CHANGE
S&P 500 (United States)	6′388.64	3.49%	8.62%
FTSE 100 (United Kingdom)	9′120.31	3.65%	11.59%
STOXX 600	549.95	1.16%	8.34%
Topix	2′951.86	3.92%	5.99%
MSCI World	4′127.47	2.95%	11.32%
Shanghai SE Composite	4′127.16	5.24%	4.89%
MSCI Emerging Markets	1′257.78	2.38%	16.95%
MSCI Latam (Latin America)	2′265.96	-1.92%	22.31%
MSCI EMEA (Europe. Middle East. Africa)	238.48	4.21%	16.80%
MSCI Asia Ex Japan	824.72	2.65%	17.13%
CAC 40 (France)	7′834.58	1.86%	6.15%
DAX (Germany)	24′217.50	0.77%	21.64%
MIB (Italy)	40′726.26	2.48%	19.13%
IBEX (Spain)	14′237.30	1.92%	22.79%
SMI (Switzerland)	11′955.73	-0.21%	3.06%
COMMODITIES	LAST PRICE	4 WEEKS CHANGE	YTD CHANGE
Steel Rebar (CNY/Tonne)	3′249.00	8.52%	-1.49%
Gold (USD/Oz)	3′337.30	1.92%	27.16%
Crude Oil WTI (USD/BbI)	65.16	-0.55%	-9.15%
Silver (USD/Oz)	38.17	5.91%	30.52%
Copper(USD/Tonne)	9′769.50	-1.10%	11.42%
Natural Gas (USD/MMBtu)	3.11	-16.82%	-14.40%

Source: Bloomberg, Indosuez Wealth Management. Past performance does not guarantee future performance.

#### MONTHLY INVESTMENT RETURNS, PRICE INDEX

 ● FTSE 100
 ● Topix
 ● MSCI World
 ● MSCI EMEA
 ● MSCI Emerging Markets

 ● ST0XX 600
 ● S&P 500
 ● Shanghai SE Composite
 ● MSCI Latam
 ● MSCI Asia Ex Japan



WORST

PERFORMING

BEST PERFORMING

(+)

Source: Bloomberg, Indosuez Wealth Management.
Past performance does not guarantee future performance.





Basis point (bps): 1 basis point = 0.01%.

**Blockchain:** A technology for storing and transmitting information. It takes the form of a database which has the particularity of being shared simultaneously with all its users and generally does not depend on any central body.

BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

BNEF: Bloomberg New Energy Finance.

**Brent:** A type of sweet crude oil, often used as a benchmark for the price of crude oil in Europe.

CPI (Consumer Price Index): The CPI estimates the general price level faced by a typical household based on an average consumption basket of goods and services. The CPI tends to be the most commonly used measure of price inflation.

**Cyclicals:** Cyclicals refers to companies that are dependent on the changes in the overall economy. These stocks represent the companies whose profit is higher when the economy is prospering.

**Defensives:** Defensives refers to companies that are more or less immune to the changes in the economic conditions.

**Deflation:** Deflation is the opposite of inflation. Contrary to inflation, it is characterised by a sustained decrease in general price levels over an extended period.

**Duration:** Reflects the sensitivity of a bond or bond fund to changes in interest rates. This value is expressed in years. The longer the duration of a bond, the more sensitive its price is to interest rate changes.

**EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes):** Refers to earnings generated before any financial interest and taxes are taken into account. It takes earnings and subtracts operating expenses and thus also corresponds to non-operating expenses.

EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation): EBITDA takes net income and adds interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation expenses back to it. It is used to measure a company's operating profitability before non-operating expenses and non-cash charges.

ECB: The European Central Bank, which governs the euro and Euro Area member countries' monetary policy.

**Economic Surprises Index:** Measures the degree of variation in macro-economic data published versus forecasters' expectations.

**Economies of scale:** Decrease in a product's unit cost that a company obtains by increasing the quantity of its production.

EPS: Earnings per share.

ESG: Non-financial corporate rating system based on environmental, social and governance criteria. It is used to evaluate the sustainability and ethical impact of an investment in a company.

Fed: The US Federal Reserve, i.e. the central bank of the United States.

**FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee):** The US Federal Reserve's monetary policy body.

**GDP (Gross Domestic Product):** GDP measures a country's yearly production of goods and services by operators residing within the national territory.

**Growth:** Growth style refers to companies expected to grow sales and earnings at a faster rate than the market average. As such, growth stocks are generally characterised by a higher valuation than the market as a whole.

IEA: International Energy Agency.

IMF: The International Monetary Fund.

Inflation breakeven: Level of inflation where nominal bonds have the same return as inflation-linked bonds (of the same maturity and grade). In other words, it is the level of inflation at which it makes no difference if an investor owns a nominal bond or an inflation-linked bond. It therefore represents inflation expectations in a geographic region for a specific maturity.

Inflation swap rate 5-Year: A market measure of what 5-Year inflation expectations will be in five years' time. It provides a window into how inflation expectations may change in the future.

IPPC: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

IRENA: International Renewable Energy Agency.

ISM: Institute for Supply Management.

Metaverse: A metaverse (portmanteau of meta and universe) is a fictional virtual world. The term is regularly used to describe a future version of the internet where virtual, persistent and shared spaces are accessible via 3D interaction.

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

"One Big Beautiful Bill Act": Is the name given to a sweeping budget reconciliation bill passed by the United States Congress and signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. It is a significant and complex piece of legislation that includes numerous provisions affecting various aspects of American life, such as taxes, healthcare, energy policy, and more.

**OPEC:** Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; 14 members.

**OPEC+:** OPEC plus 10 additional countries, notably Russia, Mexico, and Kazakhstan.

PMI: Purchasing Managers' Index.

**Policy mix:** The economic strategy adopted by a state depending on the economic environment and its objectives, mainly consisting of a combination of monetary and fiscal policy.

**Pricing power:** Refers to the ability of a company or brand to increase its prices without affecting demand for its products.

Quality: Quality stocks refers to companies with higher and more reliable profits, low debt and other measures of stable earnings and strong governance. Common characteristics of Quality stocks are high return to equity, debt to equity and earnings variability.

Quantitative easing (QE): A monetary policy tool by which the central bank acquires assets such as bonds, in order to inject liquidity into the economy.

SAFE (Security Action for Europe): The programme, backed by 150 billion euros in funding, is a European initiative designed to streamline and enhance joint arms procurement among EU Member States. It is a key component of a broader rearmament strategy for the continent, unveiled by the European Commission, with an ambitious goal of mobilising up to 800 billion euros.

SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission): The SEC is an independent federal agency with responsibility for the orderly functioning of US securities markets.

**Spread (or credit spread):** A spread is the difference between two assets, typically between interest rates, such as those of corporate bonds over a government bond.

Secular stagnation: Refers to an extended period of little or no economic growth.

SRI: Sustainable and Responsible Investments.

Stagflation: Stagflation refers to an economy that is experiencing simultaneously an increase in inflation and stagnation of economic output.

TPI: An addition to the Eurosystem's toolkit that can be activated by the ECB to counter unwarranted, disorderly market developments if these pose a serious threat to the smooth transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. The ECB Governing Council approved the instrument on the 21 July 2022.

**Trump Put:** The perception among investors that President Trump's economic policies and statements could influence the stock markets in a way that limits their downside.

Value: Value style refers to companies that appear to trade at a lower price relative to its fundamentals. Common characteristics of value stocks include high dividend yield, low price-to-book ratio, and a low price-to-earnings ratio.

VIX: The index of implied volatility in the S&P 500 Index. It measures market operators' expectations of 30-day volatility, based on index options.

WTO: World Trade Organization.



#### DISCLAIMER

This document entitled "Monthly House View" (the "Brochure") is issued for marketing communication only.

The languages in which it is drafted form part of the working languages of Indosuez Wealth Management.

The information published in the Brochure has not been reviewed and is not subject to the approval or authorisation of any regulatory or market authority whatsoever, in whatever jurisdiction.

The Brochure is not intended for or aimed at the persons of any country in particular

The Brochure is not intended for persons who are citizens, domiciled or resident in a country or jurisdiction in which its distribution, publication, availability or use would contravene applicable laws or regulations.

This document does not constitute or contain an offer or an invitation to buy or sell any financial instrument and/or service whatsoever. Similarly, it does not, in any way, constitute a strategy, personalised or general investment or disinvestment recommendation or advice, legal or tax advice, audit advice, or any other advice of a professional nature. No representation is made that any investment or strategy is suitable and appropriate to individual circumstance or that any investment or strategy constitutes a personalised investment advice to any investor.

The relevant date in this document is, unless otherwise specified, the editing date mentioned on the last page of this disclaimer. The information contained herein are based on sources considered reliable. We use our best effort to ensure the timeliness, accuracy, and comprehensives of the information contained in this document. All information as well as the price, market valuations and calculations indicated herein may change without notice. Past prices and performances are not necessarily a guide to future prices and performances.

The risks include, amongst others, political risks, credit risks, foreign exchange risks, economic risks and market risks. Before entering into any transaction you should consult your investment advisor and, where necessary, obtain independent professional advice in respect of risks, as well as any legal, regulatory, credit, tax, and accounting consequences. You are advised to contact your usual advisers in order to make your decisions independently, in light of your particular financial situation and your financial knowledge and experience.

Foreign currency rates may adversely affect the value, price or income of the investment when it is realised and converted back into the investor's base currency.

CA Indosuez a French company, the holding company for the Crédit Agricole group's wealth management business, and its related subsidiaries or entities, namely CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe), CFM Indosuez Wealth, their respective subsidiaries, branches, and representative offices, whatever their location, operate under the single brand Indosuez Wealth Management. Each of the subsidiaries, their respective subsidiaries, branches, and representative offices, as well as each of the other Indosuez Wealth Management entities are referred to individually as the "Entities" and collectively as the "Entities".

The Entities or their shareholders as well as its shareholders, subsidiaries, and more generally companies in the Crédit Agricole SA group (the "Group") and respectively their corporate officers, senior management or employees may, on a personal basis or in the name and on behalf of third parties, undertake transactions in the financial instruments described in the Brochure, hold other financial instruments in respect of the issuer or the guarantor of those financial instruments, or may provide or seek to provide securities services, financial services or any other type of service for or from these Entities. Where an Entity and/or a Crédit Agricole Group Entity acts as an investment adviser and/or manager, administrator, distributor or placement agent for certain products or services mentioned in the Brochure, or carries out other services in which an Entity or the Crédit Agricole Group has or is likely to have a direct or indirect interest, your Entity shall give priority to the investor's interest.

Some investments, products, and services, including custody, may be subject to legal and regulatory restrictions or may not be available worldwide on an unrestricted basis taking into consideration the law of your country of origin, your country of residence or any other country with which you may have ties. In particular, any the products or services featured in the Brochure are not suitable for residents of US and Canada. Products and services may be provided by Entities under their contractual conditions and prices, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and subject to their licence. They may be modified or withdrawn at any time without any notification.

 ${\it Please contact your relationship manager for further information.}$ 

In accordance with applicable regulations, each Entity makes the Brochure available:

- In France: this Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez, limited-liability company under French law (société anonyme) with share capital of 853'57'1130 euros, parent company of the Indosuez group and a fully-fledged banking establishment authorised to provide investment services and insurance brokerage, whose registered office is located at 17, rue du Docteur Lancereaux, 75008 Paris, France, registered on the Paris Trade and Companies Register under the number 572 171 635 (individual VAT identification number: FR 075 72 171 635).
- In Luxembourg: the Brochure is distributed by is distributed by: CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe), a Luxembourg public limited company (société anonyme) having its registered office at 39 allée Scheffer L-2520 Luxembourg, registered under number B91.986 in the Trade and Companies Register, alicensed credit institution established in Luxembourg and regulated by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF);
- In Spain: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe) Sucursal en España, supervised by the Banco de España (www.bde.es) and the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CAIMY, www.cnmv.es), a branch of CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe), a credit institution duly registered in Luxembourg and supervised by the Luxembourg financial regulator, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). Adress: Paseo de la Castellana numero 1, 28046 Madrid (Spain), registered with the Banco de Espana under number 1545. Registered in the Madrid Trade and Companies Register, number T 30.176, F 1,S 8, H M-543170, CIF (Company tax ID): W-D182904-C.

- In Italy: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe), Italy Branch based in Piazza Cavour 2, 20121 Milan, Italy, registered in the Register of Banks no. 8097, tax code and registration number in the Business Register of Milan, Monza Brianza and Lodi n. 97902220157.
- In Portugal: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe), Sucursal em Portugal located at Avenida da Liberdade, 190, 2.° B - 1250-147 Lisboa, Portugal, registered with the Bank of Portugal under number 282, tax code 980814227.
- In Belgium: the Brochure is distributed by Banque Degroof Petercam SA, located at rue de l'Industrie 44, 1040 Brussels, Belgium, registered in the Business Register under number 0403 212 172, registered with the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises (Belgian business database) under VAT number BE 0403 212 172 (RPM Brussels).
- Within the European Union: the Brochure may be distributed by Indosuez Wealth Management Entities authorised to do so under the Free Provision of Services.
- In Monaco: the Brochure is distributed by CFM Indosuez Wealth, 11, Boulevard Albert 1# 98000 Monaco registered in the Monaco Trade and Industry Register under number 56S00341, accreditation: EC/2012-08.
- In Switzerland: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, Quai Général-Guisan 4, 1204 Geneva and by CA Indosuez Finanziaria SA, Via F. Pelli 3, 6900 Lugano and by their Swiss branches and/or agencies. The Brochure constitutes marketing material and does not constitute the product of a financial analysis within the meaning of the directives of the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) relating to the independence of financial analysis within the meaning of Swiss law. Consequently, these directives are not applicable to the Brochure.
- In Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, Hong Kong Branch, Suite 2918, Two Pacific Place 88 Queensway Hong Kong. No information contained in the Brochure constitutes an investment recommendation. The Brochure has not been referred to the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) or any other regulatory authority in Hong Kong. The Brochure and products it may mention have not been authorised by the SFC within the meaning of sections 103, 104, 104A or 105 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571)(SFO).
- In Singapore: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, Singapore Branch 168 Robinson Road #23-03 Capital Tower, 068912 Singapore. In Singapore, the Brochure is only intended for accredited investors, institutional investors or expert investors as defined by the Securities and Futures Act 2001 of Singapore. For any questions concerning the Brochure, recipients in Singapore can contact CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, Singapore Branch.
- In the DIFC: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, DIFC Branch, AI Fattan Currency House, Tower 2 Level 23 Unit 4 DIFC PO Box 507232 Dubai UAE a company regulated by the Dubai Financial Service Authority ("DFSA"). This Brochure is intended for professional client and/or market counterparty only and no other person should act upon it. The financial products or services to which this Brochure relates will only be made available to a client who meets the DFSA professional client and /or market counterparty requirements. This Brochure is provided for information purposes only. It is not to be construed as an offer to buy or sell or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments or to participate in any particular trading strategy in any jurisdiction.
- In the UAE: the Brochure is distributed by CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA, Abu Dhabi Representative Office, Zayed The !"Street Nayel & Bin Harmal Tower, 5th Floor office 504, P.O. Box 44836 Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA operates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via its representative office which comes under the supervisory authority of the UAE Central Bank. In accordance with the rules and regulations applicable in the UAE, CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA representation office may not carry out any banking activity. The representative office may only market and promote CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SAs activities and products. The Brochure does not constitute an offer to a particular person or the general public, or an invitation to submit an offer. It is distributed on a private basis and has not been reviewed or approved by the UAE Central Bank or by another UAE regulatory authority.
- Other countries: laws and regulations of other countries may also limit the distribution of this Brochure. Anyone in possession of this Brochure must seek information about any legal restrictions and comply with them.

The Brochure may not be photocopied or reproduced or distributed, in full or in part, in any form without the prior agreement of your Bank.

© 2025, CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA/All rights reserved.

Photo credits: AdobeStock

Edited as per 23.07.2025.